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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






IN RE: SRC LIQUIDATION LLC, et al., 
                             Debtors              
 
EISNERAMPER LLC, not in its individual capacity but as Trustee of the 
SRC Liquidating GUC Trust, 




JOSEPH P. MORGAN, JR.; ROY W. BEGLEY, JR.; F. DAVID CLARKE, III;  
JOHN Q. SHERMAN, II; JULIE D. KLAPSTEIN; JOHN J. SCHIFF, JR.; 
ROBERT M. GINNAN; R. ERIC MCCARTHEY. 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(No. 1-16-cv-00119) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief Judge. 
 
Submitted: September 25, 2018 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 






                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 EisnerAmper LLC (“EisnerAmper”) appeals the dismissal of an adversary 
proceeding filed in the Bankruptcy Court against Joseph P. Morgan, Jr.; Roy W. Begley, 
Jr.; F. David Clarke, III; John Q. Sherman, II; Julie D. Klapstein; John J. Schiff, Jr.; 
Robert M. Ginnan; and R. Eric McCarthey (the “Leadership Defendants”), who are 
officers and directors of SRC Liquidation LLC (“SRC”).  At issue is whether the 
amended adversary complaint (the “complaint”) was properly dismissed.  For the reasons 
stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
As this opinion is non-precedential and we write for the parties only, our factual 
recitation is abbreviated.  EisnerAmper is the trustee of the SRC Liquidating GUC Trust 
(the “Trust”), which was formed in SRC’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.  In its 
capacity as trustee, EisnerAmper brought claims against the Leadership Defendants for 
breaches of fiduciary duties pertaining to SRC’s pre-bankruptcy acquisition of 
WorkflowOne, a purchase that — according to EisnerAmper — “quintupled SRC’s debt 
load overnight, saddled . . . SRC with extremely expensive secured term loan debt at junk 
bond rates and with very restrictive covenants, and predictably caused SRC’s complete 
demise in less than two years.”  EisnerAmper Br. 6.  The Bankruptcy Court dismissed 
Count I, which sought damages for breach of fiduciary duties applicable under Ohio law, 
with prejudice.  It dismissed the remaining counts, pertaining to the Leadership 
Defendants’ bonuses and their potential claims against SRC, without prejudice.  The 
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United States District Court for the District of Delaware affirmed, and EisnerAmper 
timely appealed to this Court. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).  We apply the same standard of review “as that 
exercised by the District Court over the decision of the Bankruptcy Court[,] . . . 
exercis[ing] plenary review over questions of law.”  In re Giacchi, 856 F.3d 244, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  We review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to dismiss Count I with prejudice 
for abuse of discretion.  See Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 
493–94 (3d Cir. 2017). 
III. 
 EisnerAmper argues that the Bankruptcy Court and District Court erred by:  
concluding that the complaint did not state plausible claims against the Leadership 
Defendants; requiring EisnerAmper to plead more than required at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage; and abusing its discretion in denying Count I with prejudice. 
 We turn to the first two arguments, which together amount to the contention that 
the complaint should not have been dismissed.  Of course, “detailed pleading is not 
generally required” at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 
F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016).  Nevertheless, the “complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Such facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  “A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) 
where an unanswered affirmative defense appears on its face.”  In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 
F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 We agree with the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court that, with respect to 
Count I, EisnerAmper failed to state a plausible claim for relief under Twombly and 
Iqbal.  Asserting a plausible claim “requires more than labels and conclusions,” In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555), and our plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task,” id. at 361 (quoting Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 679). 
   To prove that a director “violated [his fiduciary] duties” under Ohio law, a 
plaintiff must prove “that the director has not acted in good faith, in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, or 
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances.”  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(D)(1).  Thus, “[a] director shall be 
liable in damages . . . only if . . . the director’s action or failure to act involved an act or 
omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or 
undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation.”  Id. 
§ 1701.59(E).  Stating a claim for breach of fiduciary duties under Ohio law accordingly 
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requires a plaintiff to allege “facts, as distinct from generalized conclusions, which if 
proved would overcome the presumption of good faith and satisfy the requirements of 
[section] 1701.59(D).”  Abrahamson v. Waddell, 624 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ohio Com. Pl. 
1992) (dismissing action for failure to allege facts that would overcome presumption of 
good faith and satisfy section 1701.59(D)(1)); see also Tower Air, 416 F.3d at 238 
(explaining that, although, “[g]enerally speaking, we will not rely on an affirmative 
defense such as the business judgment rule to trigger dismissal of a complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) . . . where an unanswered affirmative defense appears on [the complaint’s] face, 
. . . [the plaintiff] must plead that he overcomes the presumption created by that rule”). 
In other words, EisnerAmper was required to allege facts supporting the plausible 
inference that the Leadership Defendants acted in bad faith when they created and relied 
upon certain financial projections and ultimately decided to acquire WorkflowOne.  See 
id.  Instead, the complaint presented conclusory statements about the Leadership 
Defendants’ knowledge regarding the value of WorkflowOne and its possible effects on 
SRC’s financial health at the time of the acquisition.  As the District Court correctly 
noted, “[e]ven viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to [EisnerAmper], 
they are not sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants knew or should have known that 
reliance on [certain financial projections] was unwarranted or that they acted in bad 
faith.”  District Court Dkt. No. 40, p. 14.  Requiring non-conclusory allegations does not 
impose an improper heightened standard on EisnerAmper.  Therefore, we conclude that 
its arguments are unavailing. 
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 We also conclude that the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Count I with prejudice 
was not an abuse of discretion.  As this Court has noted, one permissible ground upon 
which to dismiss a count with prejudice is futility.  See United States ex rel. Schumann v. 
AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Accordingly, we affirm 
dismissal of Schumann’s claims with prejudice because further amendment would be 
futile.”).  The Bankruptcy Court considered in-depth the possibility of salvaging the 
complaint, and it determined after comprehensive oral argument and briefing that 
EisnerAmper could not do so.  Our review of the record indicates that there is no reason 
to conclude that the Bankruptcy Court committed an abuse of discretion in reaching this 
determination or that the District Court erred in affirming. 
 The remaining counts allege that bonuses paid to the Leadership Defendants were 
fraudulent transfers.  Under both federal and Ohio law, a plaintiff pleading a fraudulent 
transfer claim (not on the basis of actual intent) must allege, inter alia, that the transfer at 
issue occurred without receipt of “a reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.04(A)(2).  One independent ground for 
the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of these counts was that EisnerAmper failed to allege 
the “reasonably equivalent value” element.  However, as the Leadership Defendants 
argue, EisnerAmper has not presented argument on this necessary element.  Instead, it 
relies solely on its position that if we reverse the dismissal of Count I, we “should also 
reverse dismissal of [the remaining counts].”  EisnerAmper Reply Br. 27.  The failure to 
challenge this independent ground for dismissal compels us to affirm.  See Nagle v. 
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Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that, where the appellant challenged 
only two of four independent grounds for a district court’s judgment against it, the Court 
“must affirm”). 1 
 We have considered the myriad arguments presented on appeal and find the 
remaining ones facially unavailing.  Having determined that there are independent 
grounds to affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s and the District Court’s decisions on each of 
the counts at issue, we need not consider additional rationales for affirmation. 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                                          
1 For example, because we resolve these counts on this independent ground, we need not 
reach EisnerAmper’s additional argument that the Bankruptcy Court and the District 
Court erred by interpreting the Ohio business judgment rule as requiring that the 
Leadership Defendants had “actual knowledge” within the meaning of section 
1701.59(D)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code Annotated to have acted without good faith. 
